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In June 2016, as the campaign for the U.S. presidency entered its final months, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren appeared at a conference convened by a Washington, D.C. think tank and offered a grim 
report on the state of markets in the United States. “[T]oday, in America,” she observed, 
“competition is dying.  Consolidation and concentration are on the rise in sector after sector.  
Concentration threatens our markets, threatens our economy, and threatens our democracy.”1   
 Senator Warren was not the first to make this critique.
2
 Yet, by giving it prominence, her 
June 2016 speech helped move competition policy into the mainstream of popular debate.
3 
Today, her themes resonate in a large and expanding commentary that recounts a growing 
market power problem in the American economy (especially in its information technology (IT) 
sector) and dysfunction in its antitrust institutions.
4
 By failing to protect competition, the federal 
antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts are said to have damaged the economy severely. 
Commentators give several reasons for the policy default: disregard of the egalitarian aims that 
motivated adoption of the U.S. antitrust laws in favor of an efficiency-based goals framework;
5
 
judicial fidelity to outdated views of industrial organization economics;
6
 and enforcement 
timidity rooted in the capture by potential prosecutorial targets of the federal enforcement 
agencies, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC).
7
   
 The grievances sketched above have led to widespread debate and intensified demands for a 
redirection of antitrust policy and the application of other policy instruments to increase 
competition. High on the agenda is an extension of policy to provide greater control of the 
practices of leading technology companies (or Tech Giants) and dominant firms in other sectors 
such as agribusiness and pharmaceuticals.  
                                                 
1
 Senator Elizabeth Warren, Reigniting Competition in the American Economy Keynote Remarks at New America’s 
Open Markets Program Event (Washington, D.C., June 29, 2016), available at 
www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-29_Warren_Antitrust_Speech.pdf. 
2
 A notable earlier statement of these concerns appears in BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY 
CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010).  
3
 In the typical week, public figures give countless numbers of speeches at events organized by think tanks in 
Washington, D.C. Senator Warren’s speech nonetheless immediately attracted attention. See Paul Glastris, Elizabeth 
Warren’s Consolidation Speech Could Change the Election, Washington Monthly, June 30, 2016, 
www.washingtonmonthly.com/2016/06/30/elizabeth-warrens-consolidation-speech-could-change-the-election/; 
Brent Kendall, Elizabeth Warren Says Competition Is ‘Dying” as She Voices Fears Over Amazon, Apple, Wall St. 
Journal, June 30, 2016. See also  Ron Knox, Elizabeth Warren Is the Perfect Antitrust Crusader for 2020, Slate, Jan. 
4, 2019, at https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/elizabeth-warren-2020-antitrust-monopoly-crusader.html; 
Rhys Blakely, Tech titans, once the darlings of US politics, are recast as enemies, The Times (London), Sept,. 23, 
2017, at 46; Rana Foroohar, Tech ‘superstars’ risk a populist backlash, Fin. Times, Apr. 26, 2017, at 11 
4 See, e.g., ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE STUCKE, COMPETITION OVERDOSE: HOW FREE MARKET MYTHOLOGY 
TRANSFORMED US FROM CITIZEN KINGS TO MARKET SERVANTS  (Forthcoming 2020); RANA FOROOHAR, DON’T BE 
EVIL – THE CASE AGAINST BIG TECH (2019); THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL – HOW AMERICA GAVE UP 
ON FREE MARKETS (2019); JONATHAN TEPPER & DENISE HEARN, THE MYTH OF CAPITALISM – MONOPOLIES AND 
THE DEATH OF COMPETITION (2019); MATT STOLLER, GOLIATH: THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY POWER 
AND DEMOCRACY (2019). 
5
 See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710 (2017). 
6
 See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM – RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (2019); 
Collection: Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916 (2018). 
7
 See, e.g., PHILIPPON, supra note 4, at 153-75; TEPPER & HEARN, supra note 4, at 162-65. 
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 Although there are dramatically different views as to how exactly change should take place 
(see further Section II below), many proponents of change stress the urgent need for more 
vigorous and aggressive enforcement of the antitrust laws, especially by the federal agencies. For 
example, there are calls for the agencies: to police future mergers more strictly, perhaps with 
bans or presumptions against certain mergers (including acquisitions by large incumbent 
enterprises of promising start-ups); to limit vertical integration; and to arrest exclusionary 
conduct by dominant companies.  
 Other suggested means of control include the creation of a new regulatory authority – vested 
in the antitrust agencies or in a new government body – with power to promulgate rules that 
would establish industry-wide codes of conduct, allow for the restructuring of dominant firms 
and/or bar dominant firms from selling their own products on the platforms they own.
8
  
 Some demand a “root-and-branch” transformation of the antitrust system that would 
embrace objectives beyond enhancing the welfare of citizens as buyers of goods and services.
9
 
The expanded goals framework would seek to protect the interests of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), workers, and local communities, and, in doing so, to safeguard democracy 
itself. To this end, some suggest that the enforcement agencies should cease devoting resources 
to “trivial” cases aimed at forestalling efforts by individual entrepreneurs and SMEs to earn 
suitable wages;
10
 instead, agencies should focus single-mindedly on curbing monopoly by, for 
example, using structural remedies to unwind consummated anticompetitive mergers, to 
deconcentrate markets, and to prevent future antitrust violations.
11
  
 The debate has refocused the spotlight on basic issues about the aims of the U.S. antitrust 
system: what goal, or goals, should guide the interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust 
statutes; what are the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a “purist” efficiency-orientation 
or a multi-faceted goals agenda, regime; and how a multi-dimensional set of objectives, anchored 
in cases such as United States v Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)
12
 and Brown Shoe Co. v 
United States
13
 (monopolization and merger decisions respectively), could be applied effectively 
by antitrust agencies in designing an enforcement program and by the courts in resolving 
individual cases. 
                                                 
8 
E.g., Stigler Centre Committee on Digital Platforms, Final Report, 2019 (Stigler Report) proposes establishing of a 
new digital regulatory agency (also the UK Digital Competition Expert Panel Report, Unlocking Digital 
Competition (March 2019) (Furman Report) speaks of establishing a new digital “unit”). See also e.g., Haley 
Sweetland Edwards, Washington Takes on the Threat of Big Tech, TIME (Sept. 6, 2018), 
http://time.com/5388338/dc-google-facebook-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/ 4V98-W6HN]; Seth Fiegerman, Facebook 
Faces New Regulatory Backlash over Data Privacy, CNN TECH (June 4, 2018, 1:28 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/04/technology/facebook-data-backlash/index.html [https://perma.cc/XE66-RK7F 
9
 Sandeep Vaheesan of the Open Markets Institute has used this phrase to describe the need for a far-reaching reform 
of the US antitrust system.  Sandeep Vaheesan, How Robert Bork Fathered the New Gilded Age, PROMARKET BLOG 
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://promarket.org/how-robert-bork-fathered-the-new-gilded-age/ (“Antirust law needs root and 
branch reconstruction.”). 
10
 See, e.g., Lina Khan, How to Reboot the FTC, POLITICO (Apr.13, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/04/ftc-antitrust-economy-monopolize-00090] (calling the FTC “an 
agency adrift” that is “squandering resources on trivial cases”). 
11
 Bernie Sanders, Corporate Accountability and Democracy (2020), https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-
accountability-and-democracy/; Elizabeth Warren, How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://edlizabethwarren.com/plans/break-up-big-tech.   
12
 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).  
13
 370 US 294, 325 (1962). 
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 The modern critique must be taken seriously. Three of the candidates that were seeking the 
Democratic Party’s nomination in the 2020 elections – Senator Warren,14 Senator Bernie 
Sanders,
15
 and Senator Amy Klobuchar16 – have issued legislative proposals to carry out basic 
reforms of the U.S. antitrust system.  The impulse for a redirection of antitrust policy is not 
merely partisan. President Donald Trump has voiced his support for closer antitrust scrutiny of 
leading firms, including Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (GAFA),
17
 and Republican 
legislators such as Senator Josh Hawley have suggested a fundamental retooling of the federal 
enforcement mechanism.
18
 The changing political mood appears to have spurred the public 
enforcement agencies to expand their programs, using existing policy tools, to address the 
accumulation and exercise of market power in the tech sector,
19
 and the FTC has launched a 
study, using compulsory process, of acquisitions not subject to the government’s premerger 
notification requirements that were undertaken by Amazon, Alphabet (including Google), Apple, 
Facebook, and Microsoft from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2019.
20
 Regardless 
therefore of which candidate prevails in the November 2020 presidential election, the U.S. 
antitrust system seems poised for expansion.  
 In this Article, we do not debate the condition of competition in the U.S. economy, nor do 
we assess the substantive merits of the respective measures proposed to correct the market and 
policy deficiencies identified. Instead, we focus on a less noticed issue – the policy 
implementation challenges that stand between the soaring reform aspirations and their effective 
realization in practice. We thus take the reform recommendations – presented in scholarly 
papers, blue ribbon studies, and in popular essays – at face value, and ask what legislators and 
policy makers must do to land them. For example, assuming that more aggressive antitrust 
enforcement is required, how can an effective program actually be delivered – through winning 
antitrust cases and securing positive change – and how can it be delivered well?  
                                                 
14
 See Senator Elizabeth Warren, Anti-Monopoly and Competition Restoration Act (Dec.9, 2019) (draft legislation 
on file with authors) and e.g., Eric Newcomer & Joshua Brustein, Elizabeth Warren Is Drafting US Legislation to 
Reverse Megamergers, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2019) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-04/warren-
is-drafting-u-s-legislation-to-reverse-mega-mergers; Lauren Hirsch, Elizabeth Warren’s antitrust bill would 




 See Sanders, Corporate Accountability and Democracy, supra note 11. 
16
 See e.g., S 1812, Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017, §5 (Sept. 14, 2017) 
(provision creating office of consumer advocate within the FTC), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1812/text .  
17
 See Brian Fung, Amazon, Facebook and Google are all being looked at for antitrust violations, Trump says, 
WASHINGTON POST (\Nov. 5, 2018), https://washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/05/amazon-facebook-google-
are-all-being-looked-at-for-antitrust-violations-trump-says/.   
18
 See, e.g., Josh Hawley, Overhauling the Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 10, 2020) (suggesting, among other 
reforms, that the FTC be recreated as a unit within the Department of Justice Antitrust Division), 
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-02/Hawley-FTC-Overhaul.pdf.  
19
 See Tim Cross, Will Big Tech be Broken Up in 2020? A Guide to the Antitrust Cases Facing GAFA, VIDEO AD 
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2019), https://videoadnews.com/2019/12/09/will-big-tech-be-broken-up-in-2020-a-guide-to-the-
antitrust-cases-facing-gafa/.  
20





 In our view, these “implementation” issues have tended to be overlooked in the modern 
critique and to have been too quickly side-lined as technical details to be (easily) addressed once 
the high level concepts of a bold antitrust program have been settled.
21
 Implementation is not, 
however, a simple matter that will necessarily sort itself out once the intellectual architecture is 
in place. Rather, inattention to implementation challenges invites serious disappointment by 
creating a chasm between elevated policy commitments and the capacity of responsible public 
institutions (competition agencies, new regulators, and the courts) to produce expected outcomes. 
This is the implementation blindside.  Unless the blindside is acknowledged and addressed, there 
is a significant risk that a major reform program will engage considerable resources, public and 
private, in initiatives that fall well short of their goals.  Instead of restoring confidence in the 
ability of government agencies to enforce antitrust laws effectively, a failed effort might merely 
reinforce doubts, and cynicism, about the quality of public administration.  
 This Article analyzes important impediments that are likely, if not carefully addressed, to 
hamper delivery of the current proposals to expand competition policy significantly and proposes 
ways to overcome them. It commences in Part II by introducing the principal flaws that modern 
commentary attributes to U.S. antitrust policy (the “crisis in antirust”), before describing some of 
the proposals offered to bolster competition, strengthen antitrust policy, and restore its centrality 
as a tool of economic control. It also sketches how the federal and state agencies are responding 
to demands for more extensive intervention. As already explained, the purpose of this section is 
not to address the (respective) merits of these policy proposals, but to identify the magnitude of 
the implementation challenges that the proposals for a major expansion of the U.S. antitrust 
program create.  
 Part III sets out the chief implementation obstacles that confront efforts to execute bolder 
antitrust programs, including tougher scrutiny of mergers and dominant firm conduct. We draw 
parallels between current debates and past ones, including those that influenced enhanced 
antitrust enforcement (especially by the FTC) in the 1960s and early 1970s and use historical 
examples to show what might happen if these hurdles are underestimated or ignored in the 
formulation of bold new initiatives. 
 Before concluding, Part IV of the paper considers what it is likely to take to implement the 
proposals, and a program of expansion, successfully. It emphasizes measures to ensure that 
reform commitments properly account for the capacity of the public agencies to execute the 
commitments successfully. The discussion includes consideration of how antitrust agencies 
might undertake a more ambitious program with or without receiving new powers or resources 
from Congress.  
II. THE MODERN PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
A. The Crisis in Antitrust 
At a high level, the modern critique of U.S. antitrust policy argues (with resemblances to 
criticism voiced in earlier eras
22
) that antitrust shortcomings – including lax federal enforcement 
                                                 
21
 One of us (Kovacic) spent several years in private practice working for aerospace industry clients which had 
major roles in the US space program in the 1960s.  One company official remarked that the essential physics of 
going to the moon was fairly straightforward. By contrast, the engineering was very difficult.  
22
 Both at the end of the 19
th
 century (about the inability of the common law to curb the rising power of the trusts 
which led to the adoption of the Antitrust Laws) and subsequently in the mid twentieth century (about the negative 
impact on economic performance and the nation’s social and political health caused by the US agencies’ failure to 
6 
 
and judicial acceptance of permissive antitrust doctrine since the mid-1970s – have contributed 
significantly to large increases in concentration and the creation, and entrenchment, of market 
power in many sectors of the economy.
23
 These developments are said to have raised prices for 
consumers, diminished innovation and new business development, and increased business 
margins and profits.
24
 Some commentators and politicians go further and emphasize the adverse 
consequences of these changes on democracy
25
 and income or economic inequality,
26
 so laying 
at antitrust’s feet “a myriad of perceived socio-political problems.”27 In these critiques, weak 
antitrust enforcement is one key element of a larger failure of government to promote 
competition to spur growth, to ensure that all citizens enjoy the fruits of prosperity, and to 
safeguard the sound functioning of the democratic process. 
 Modern critiques often compare the current antitrust system to enforcement policy between 
the late 1930s and the early 1970s. In this era, courts and enforcement agencies developed strict 
rules governing collusive agreements among competitors, vertical agreements between 
manufacturers and distributors, and dominant firm behavior. In addition, with the adoption in 
1950 of the Celler-Kefauver Act,
28
 Congress bolstered the Clayton Act’s merger control 
provision,
29
 which the DOJ and the FTC applied aggressively to challenge business 
combinations. With encouragement from the Supreme Court, the agencies imposed tough 
restrictions on horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.
30
 Judicial decisions and enforcement 
policy embraced an egalitarian vision that emphasized the attainment of objectives (such as the 
preservation of SMEs and democracy) beyond the promotion of economic efficiency.
31
 Public 
enforcement and jurisprudence formed what Jonathan Baker has called a political bargain that 
tolerated the development of large firms in return for the assurance, provided by robust antitrust 
policy, that such firms would not attain or abuse positions of dominance through improper 
exclusionary tactics, and that rivals would not use mergers or cartels to achieve and exploit 
market power.
32
 Among other effects, the political bargain helped forestall the adoption of more 
intrusive forms of regulatory supervision, such as public utility control of pricing and entry. 
                                                                                                                                                             
use the antitrust laws to halt industrial concentration), see e.g., Edward H. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly 
14 U. CHI. L. REV 153 (1947), Eugene V Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress 14 U. 
CHI. L. Rev 567 (1947); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER. ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1959); and William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense”: Michael Pertschuk’s 
Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981 WILLIAM & MARY L.R. 1269 (2019). 
23
 BAKER, supra note 6, 20. 
24
 See e.g., Jason Furman and Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality 
in TOWARD A JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS (Martin Guzman. Ed., 
2018), JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES (MIT Press, 2015), BAKER, supra note 6, 15 
and Anti-Monopoly and Competition Restoration Bill, supra note 14. 
25
 See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS—ANTITRUST IN THE GILDED AGE 138-139 (2018); Barry Lynn, The Anti-
Monopoly Case Against Google: A conversation with Open Markets The Verge, July 15, 2017, at 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/5/16243868/google-monopoly-antitrust-open-markets-barry-lynn. 
26
 See e.g., Khan, supra note 5; Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality, The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and its Discontent, 11 HARV L & POL’Y REV, 234 (2017); Hal Singer, While Trump Blames 
Immigrants For Low Wages, An Alternative Theory Gains Traction Among Economists, Forbes (2018) 
27
 Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jan Rybnicek, and Jonathan Klick, Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise 
and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust 51 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL 293. 
28
 P.L. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). 
29
 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
30
 See e.g., ABA Antitrust Section, MONOGRAPH NO, 12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS: LAW AND POLICY 1-4 (1986). 
31
 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
32
 Jonathan B Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2006). 
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Largely unchallenged by significant foreign economic rivals, and perhaps facilitated by strong 
antitrust oversight, the U.S. economy enjoyed extraordinary growth from the end of World War 
II through the 1960s.  
 The rising concern articulated in the modern critique is that developments since the mid-
1970s have depleted the force of antitrust law. As described below, commentators assign 
responsibility to various factors, including: the Supreme Court’s misguided acceptance of the 
notion that Congress intended the Sherman Act to be an efficiency-oriented “consumer welfare 
prescription”;33 judicial decisions that narrowed antitrust law’s reach; and permissive antitrust 
enforcement.  
 (i) Repudiation of the True Goals of the Antitrust Statutes. Although proponents for change 
have different perspectives (see infra II.B), some contend that the courts and enforcement 
agencies were wrong, from the mid-1970s to the present, to abandon the broad vision that 
Congress had embraced in enacting the Sherman Act in 1890,
34
 the Clayton Act
35
 and Federal 
Trade Commission Act in 1914,
36
 the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,
37
 and the Celler-Kefauver 
Act in 1950.
38
 Courts and enforcement agencies have replaced the original legislative 
commitment to protect smaller firms from oppression and preserve a democratic political order 
with a single-minded focus on consumer welfare and efficiency.
39
 Some argue that the 
abandonment of antitrust law’s original concern about the full range of injuries that monopoly 
inflicts on citizens – not simply as purchasers of goods and services, but also as workers, 
entrepreneurs, shop owners in local communities, and participants in the democratic process – is 
the chief cause of what has gone wrong with the U.S. antitrust system.
40
  
 (ii) Retrenchment in Antitrust Doctrine. It also has been argued that guided by a false 
conception of antitrust’s goals, or how its goal (or goals) is to be achieved, the federal courts 
have raised procedural, evidential, and substantive bars to antitrust actions excessively, and gone 
too far in loosening antitrust restrictions governing vertical agreements, dominant firm behavior, 
and mergers.
41
 Reflecting a deep-seated concern about the hazards of over-enforcement, 
                                                 
33
 This phrase appeared first in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). Senator Warren’s draft bill, 
supra note 14, specifically states that antitrust laws were not created exclusively to enhance the narrowly defined 
concept “consumer welfare” as articulated by academics such Robert Bork, or as described by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), and its progeny. 
34
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
35
 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. 
36
 See especially 15 U.S.C. § 45 (declaring unlawful unfair methods of competition). 
37
 Pub. L. No., 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13). 
38
 Reforming and strengthening the Clayton Act merger provisions, see especially now 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
39
 See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 377, 464-67 (2003) (describing modern acceptance by U.S. federal antitrust agencies of an efficiency-oriented 
goals framework); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm 
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix Colum. BUS. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2008) (describing contributions of 
Chicago and Harvard scholars to development of an efficiency-oriented U.S. antitrust goals framework).  
40 See e.g., Lina M. Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, supra note 26, 269-72, 277-79; Marshall Steinbaum, The 
Consumer Welfare Standard Is an Outdated Holdover from a Discredited Economic Theory (Roosevelt Institute: 
Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/consumer-welfare-standard-outdated-holdover-discredited-
economic-theory/ . 
40
 See WU and Lynn, supra note 25. 
41
 See e.g., Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc 429 US 477 (1977), Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, 
Inc, 433 US 36, Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp 465 US 752 (1984), Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579 (1993), Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP 2 
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confidence in the ability of markets to renew themselves, and wariness of the U.S. system of 
private rights of action,
42
 the courts have systematically and incrementally diminished the 
likelihood that a plaintiff can prevail in antitrust litigation. Not only have these developments 
discouraged private litigation, but they have made the federal agencies more risk averse in 
deciding whether to challenge dominant enterprises
43
 or attack mergers, except in cases of 
unusually high concentration. 
 (iii) Misguided and Timid Federal Enforcement. The modern critique also argues that U.S. 
enforcement policy has gone badly astray since the 1970s. For the most part, the DOJ and the 
FTC are said to have declined to challenge dominant firms and oligopolies;
44
 overlooked the 
harmful effects of vertical integration;
45
 and allowed mergers that increased concentration or 
allowed dominant incumbents to absorb smaller firms that may have emerged as major 
competitive forces.
46
 At the same time, the federal agencies are said to have squandered precious 
resources on trivial matters (notably, the prosecution of horizontal restraints cases involving 
small, poorly paid service providers). 
 For a mixture of all or some of these reasons, an increasing number of advocates are 
becoming supporters for a more expanded competition policy.  
B. The Proposed Cures 
The critiques touched on in the section above are varied and result from different policy 
perspectives. Broadly, advocates for change can be group into three categories: (i) do 
substantially more with the existing antitrust system; (ii) do more with the existing system and 
enact additional regulatory mechanisms; and (iii) undertake a “root-and-branch” transformation 
of the U.S. competition policy system.  
 Although we survey the reform proposals from the broad perspective of each of these groups 
below, we recognize that this classification scheme is imperfect. For example, all three groups 
share some policy preferences – such as increasing scrutiny of dominant firm conduct and 
stiffening merger control. Further, although differences across the groups are detectable with 
respect to goals, and views differ about whether the consumer welfare standard has betrayed the 
                                                                                                                                                             
540 US 398 (2004), Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc 551 US 877 (2007) and Bell Atlantic Corp v 
Twombly 550 US 554 (2007). 
42
 See e.g., Trinko and Twombly, ibid.  
43
 An awareness of how difficult it has become to transit the gauntlet of hostile jurisprudence is reflected by the 
limited results produced by recent federal enforcement programs. It is noteworthy, for example, that despite a 
commitment in early 2009 to expand Section 2 enforcement significantly, the Obama Administration’s DOJ 
Antitrust Division brought few section 2 cases (none of them remarkable). See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Has the 
Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement? 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 18-19 (July 18, 
2012).  In January 2013, the FTC closed its investigation into Google’s conduct related to online searches.  Federal 
Trade Commission, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices (Jan. 3, 
2013), https://ftc.govsystem/files/documents/public_statements/295971/13-103/googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf.  
44
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antitrust laws, the first two groups would continue to emphasize consumer interests in designing 
policy. In contrast, the “root-and-branch” group would adopt a broader conception of citizen 
welfare that accounts for the well-being of individuals as purchasers of goods and services but 
also as workers and owners of smaller businesses. Views about the severity of measures needed 
to correct existing market pathologies also vary across the groups. 
 (i) Do Substantially More with the Existing System. One major group of reform advocates 
argues that the journey toward better policy does not require the adoption of new statutes, wholly 
new goals, or the creation of new regulatory institutions. This group would employ a concept of 
consumer welfare that encompasses effects on prices, quality, and innovation; it would not 
extend the range of goals to include effects on small business or the well-being of workers 
(except as injured by the exercise of monopsony power).
47
 In their view, the existing framework 
presents untapped possibilities for a more activist program. The bases for needed improvements 
would be evolution in, and the imaginative application of, existing doctrine
48
 and, crucially, a 
recalibration of error cost analysis
49
 which today suggests that the hazards of intervening too 
much to correct certain phenomena (for example, improper exclusion by dominant firms) exceed 
the costs of intervening too little. Federal enforcement agencies should be more proactive and 
change their appetite for risk by bringing more cases in the courts, even if they might fail.
50
 They 
consequently place the burden on antitrust agencies to be mindful of the threat of under-
enforcement and to undertake a more ambitious agenda, extending far beyond its current focus, 
and scrutinizing a wide range of exclusionary or collusive behavior and mergers, including: 
 Vertical restraints, such as platform MFNs; 
 Practices of standard setting organizations that allow owners of standard essential patents to 
exploit their market power; 
 Conduct arising in regulated, or recently deregulated, markets; 
 Refusals to deal, predatory pricing, and other newer forms of monopolization; 
 Horizontal shareholdings in concentrated product markets; 
 Horizontal and vertical mergers, especially through the revival and strengthening of the 
structural presumption and vigorous scrutiny of acquisitions of start-ups. 
 (ii) Do Substantially More with the Existing System and Create a New Digital Regulator. 
The second group largely accepts the agenda described above and would make one notable 
addition: the creation of a new regulatory body to oversee digital technology giants. As proposed 
by the Stigler Center report on competition in digital markets,
51
 the new regulator would have 
power to set rules governing the conduct of leading digital platforms – for example, by imposing 
non-discrimination obligations on platforms and even to break them up. This proposal draws 
                                                 
47
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upon and extends recommendations made by a United Kingdom advisory panel to create a new 
“digital markets unit” within the UK government.52  
 (iii) Root-and-Branch Transformation. The third collection of reform proponents is 
generally receptive to the proposals of the first two groups, but argues that these measures are 
seriously incomplete. Advocates of the root-and-branch approach (which include leading 
political figures such as Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren) contend that more 
dramatic reform is required to deal with America’s “market power problem”, as monopolies and 
oligopolies not only raise consumer costs, block entrepreneurship, stunt investment, and retard 
innovation but also “depress wages and salaries” and “concentrate political power, which they 
use to win favorable policies and further entrench their dominance”.53 These advocates claim that 
as today’s market problem resulted from abandonment of antitrust law’s true aims, antitrust must 
return to its origins embedded in a broader citizen-welfare standard that addresses employment 
security, wage levels, economic freedom of consumers, the well-being of SMEs, the preservation 
of democracy, the diffusion of concentrated private and political power and a wariness of 
monopoly power in all of its forms.
54
  
 The root-and-branch program would have two dimensions. The first would have the DOJ 
and the FTC use existing powers to reorient enforcement in a way which would resemble but 
expand the enforcement agenda we describe above for the do-more-with-what-exists groups. 
Secondly, however, because proponents of root-and-branch reform believe that an expanded use 
of existing tools will not suffice to transform the U.S. regime, they contend that legislation is 




 Reorientation of enforcement would require both a curtailment, repudiation, or revisions of 
some existing programs (e.g., advocacy and law enforcement efforts that challenge occupational 
licensure restrictions or attack efforts by low-wage service providers to raise their fees
56
) and 
expanding enforcement through: 
 Challenging individual dominant firms and tight oligopolies, with routine recourse to 
structural remedies to deconcentrate affected sectors (including the prosecution of new 
antitrust cases to break up technology firms, including GAFA);
57
  
 Using expanded theories to challenge vertical integration by contract or ownership;58 
 Challenging price discrimination, through restoration of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement 
as a core element of federal antitrust policy;
59
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55
 See e.g., Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce 119 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 973 (2019). 
56
 See e.g., Vaheesan, supra note 9.  
57
 See, e.g., WU, supra note 25, at 127-39; Jonathan Tepper, We are all losing out as corporate concentration grows, 
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2018, at 13; Robert Reich, Break Up Facebook (and while we’re at it, Google, Apple and 
Amazon) THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2018 (“We should break up the hi-tech behemoths, or at least require they make 
their proprietary technology and data publicly available and share their platforms with smaller companies.”), at 
https://www.theguardian.org/commentisfree/2018/nov/20/facebook-google-antitrust-laws-gilded-age; Matt Stoller, 
The Return of Monopoly, New Republic, Aug. 10, 2017. 
58
 See, e.g., Khan, supra note 5. 
59 
See Stoller, supra note 4. Modern federal enforcement policy has retreated dramatically from high levels of 
enforcement that prevailed in the 1960s. See D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
11 
 
 Strictly oppose mergers whose concentrative effect exceeds levels set by the U.S. 
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines issued in 1968
60
 and adhering to the policy aims set 
out in Supreme Court decisions such as Brown Shoe v. United States;
61
  
 Using potential competition theories to bar leading firms from acquiring smaller, start-up 
enterprises that could otherwise emerge as strong challengers to incumbent giants and make a 
broad category of mergers between large firms presumptively unlawful;
62
 
 Closely scrutinizing completed mergers, and the conditions attached to them, including 




 Routine FTC use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to overcome doctrinal limitations imposed by 
existing Sherman Act and Clayton Act jurisprudence that embraces a consumer welfare 
standard and unduly confines the interpretation of these statutes.
64
 
 Promulgation by the FTC of trade regulation rules to establish codes of behavior applicable 
on an economy-wide basis.
65
 
 Such steps are to be facilitated, reinforced, and supplemented by suggested legislative steps, 
for example:  
 The creation of a new competition advocate to survey markets, receive complaints, and make 
public recommendations for investigations by the FTC and DOJ into possible market 
exploitation and anticompetitive  behavior;
66
 
 New legislation banning or limiting information services platforms, or other monopolists, 




                                                                                                                                                             
2064 (2015).  Revival of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement would provide a means to discipline powerful buyers – 
an important objective of advocates who call for a redirection of U.S. antitrust enforcement. 
60
 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101, 2016 WL 
6107271. 
61
 370 U.S. 294, 315-23, 322 note 38 (1961). 
62
 See, e.g., Michael Kades, Antitrust remedies to the domination of digital technologies and the acquisition of 
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 New legislation to limit mergers that unfairly consolidate corporate power, in particular 
through the application of strong presumptions or bans against certain mergers (e.g., large or 
“megamergers”70) or through use of presumptions designed to prevent not only mergers that 
will increase prices, but those that will reduce wages, cut jobs, lower quality, limit access to 
services, stifle innovation, or hinder the ability of SMEs to compete. The purpose of the new 
legislation would be to facilitate successful challenges by agencies and to incentivize 
companies to be better corporate citizens. 
C. Implementing a more ambitious enforcement agenda – the steps so far 
Demands for stronger competition programs are already inspiring adjustments at the DOJ and the 
FTC. Over the past two years, the FTC has conducted an extensive set of public hearings to 
consider how it can meet changes in, and the new demands of the economy.
71
 In addition, it has 
established a Technology Enforcement Division in its Bureau of Competition to lead its 
enforcement efforts in the high-tech sector.
72
 Both federal agencies have initiated investigations 
of the Tech Giants, the agencies are in the process of preparing vertical merger guidelines (for 
the first time since 1984)
73
 and Digital Guidelines, and the DOJ is conducting a review of 
leading online platforms to identify practices that create or maintain structural impediments to 
greater competition.
74
 All of these activities have accompanied the stated commitment of the 
federal agencies to apply more resources and scrutiny to dominant firms and to mergers 
involving the acquisition by major incumbents of nascent competitors.
75
 The federal activity is 
taking place against the backdrop of visible, significant inquiries by state attorneys general, 
individually and collectively, into the conduct of digital platforms, including Google and other 
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leading technology firms. It is easy to imagine that the collection of federal and state efforts will 
lead to the initiation of new cases in 2020.
76
 
III. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 
The proponents of change have set out a breathtaking agenda for reform. The various papers and 
reports are powerfully reasoned and argued but devote relatively little attention to the question of 
how their proposals can be achieved successfully. Rather many of them seem to be predicated on 
the assumption that any legislative changes required can be introduced rapidly and that the new, 
more aspiring, program can be driven home straightforwardly by agencies led by courageous 
leaders and supported by a larger staff that shares the vision for fundamental change. 
 The discussion below, and history, seems to indicate, however, that more courage and more 
people will not necessarily overcome the implementation obstacles that stand in the way of a 
program that requires the rapid prosecution of a large number of complex cases against well-
resourced and powerful companies. Indeed, the criticisms levied at the current system, the 
proposals for more effective enforcement and reform, and the scale of the action being 
demanded, bear some resemblance to those that led to a more re-invigorated and aggressive 
antitrust enforcement policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. For example, at that time complaints 
that the FTC was in decay, was obsessed with trivial cases and failing to address matters of 
economic importance, anticompetitive conduct and rising concentration,
77
 led the FTC to embark 
on a new, bold and astoundingly broad enforcement program.
78
 In an effort to meet criticisms of 
it as a shambolic and failing institution, the FTC sought to upgrade its processes for policy 
planning, made concerted efforts to improve its human capital in management and case-handling, 
and sought to improve substantive processes and the quality of its competition and consumer 
protection analysis.  
 In the end, the FTC’s efforts to improve capability proved insufficient to support the 
expanded enforcement agenda, partly because the Commission failed to formulate an adequate 
plan to overcome the full range of implementation obstacles. The FTC seriously overreached 
because it did not grasp, or devise strategies to deal with, the scale and intricacies of its expanded 
program of cases and trade regulation rules, the ferocious opposition that big cases with huge 
remedial stakes would provoke from large defendants seeking to avoid divestitures, compulsory 
licensing, or other measures striking at the heart of their business, and the resources required to 
deliver good results. The Commission lacked the capacity to run novel shared monopoly cases 
that sought the break-up of the country’s eight leading petroleum refiners and four leading 
breakfast cereal manufacturers
79
 and simultaneously pursue an abundance of other high stake, 
difficult matters involving monopolization, distribution practices, and horizontal collaboration. 
                                                 
76
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The FTC also overlooked swelling political opposition, stoked by the vigorous lobbying of 
Congress, that its aggressive litigation program provoked.
80
 
 New legislation envisaged by reform advocates could ease the path for current government 
agencies seeking to reduce excessive levels of industrial concentration by arresting 
anticompetitive behavior of dominant enterprises (through interim and permanent relief) and by 
blocking mergers that pose incipient threats to competition. It seems clear, however, that such 
dramatic legislative proposals are likely to be fiercely contested through the legislative process 
and so will take time, and be difficult, to enact. Further, even if armed with a more powerful 
mandate, the DOJ and the FTC will still have to bring what are likely to be challenging cases 
applying the new laws (see Section F below). The adoption, setting up and bedding in of new 
legislation or regulatory structures and bodies is therefore unlikely to happen very quickly and is, 
consequently, unlikely to meet the demands of those seeking urgent and immediate action now.  
 These difficulties suggest that for the near future, at least, the agencies will have to achieve 
successful extensions of policy mainly through launching themselves into a number of lengthy, 
complex investigations and litigation based on the current regime. This means establishing 
violations under existing judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws and making a convincing 
case for the imposition of effective remedies, including structural relief. 
 The discussion in this section identifies likely impediments to implementation of ambitious 
reforms, either through litigation (under the present-day regime) or legislation. These include 
judicial resistance to broader applications of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts, the 
complexities of designing effective remedies, the uncertainty of long-term political support for 
ambitious reforms and the possibilities for political backlash once agencies begin prosecuting 
major new cases, and the complications, and resistance, that confronts any effort in the United 
States to make legislative change.  
A. Judicial Resistance to Extensions of Existing Antitrust Doctrine 
As noted in Section II.A above, judicial decisions since the mid-1970s have reshaped antitrust 
law, created more permissive substantive standards governing dominant firm conduct, mergers, 
and vertical restraints and raised the bar to antitrust claims in a number of ways. This remoulding 
has been facilitated by the Court’s conclusion that the Sherman Act constitutes “a special kind of 
common law offense”,81 so that Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute's 
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”82 This has allowed the statutory 
commands to be interpreted flexibly, and the law to evolve with new circumstances and new 
wisdom;
83
 for example, where there is widespread agreement that the previous position is 
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 The proposed solutions will depend, in the short term at least, upon the ability of 
enforcement agencies to navigate the described jurisprudence to find an antitrust infringement 
and, in some instances, a further rethinking, refinement and/or development of doctrine, through 
softening, modification, or even a reversal of current case law. Although such an evolution could 
in theory result, as it did over the last 40 years, from a steady stream of antitrust cases, judicial 
appointments since 2017 have arguably made such a change in direction unlikely. Rather, it 
seems more probable that successful prosecution of major antitrust, and especially Section 2 
Sherman Act monopolization cases, will remain challenging and may even become more 
difficult. Cases will be litigated before judges who are ordinarily predisposed to accept the 
current framework, either by personal preference or by a felt compulsion to abide by forty years 
of jurisprudence that tells them to do so.
85
 A new president could gradually change the 
philosophy of the federal courts by appointing judges sympathetic to the aims of the proposed 
transformation.
86
 The reorientation of the courts through judicial appointments is however, likely 
to take a long time.
87
  
 Until then, trial judges and the Court of Appeals will be compelled to abide by the existing 
jurisprudence and will only be at liberty to develop a more flexible approach in the “gaps” or 
spaces left by Supreme Court opinions – e.g., in relation to mergers and rebates – and through 
creative interpretations of the law. Such cases are, however, likely to be hard fought. Indeed, 
Judge Lucy Koh’s finding in Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm, Inc.88 that Qualcomm’s 
licensing practices constituted unlawful monopolization of the market for certain 
telecommunications chips has provoked hostile attacks, not only from practitioners and 
academics but from the DOJ, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy, and even one of the 
FTC’s own members. In a scathing op ed in the Wall Street Journal,89 Commissioner Christine 
Wilson attacked Judge Koh’s “startling new creation” of legal obligations that may trigger a new 
wave of enforcement actions and undermine intellectual property rights. Commissioner Wilson 
condemned the judge’s “judicial innovations”, and “alchemy”, through reviving and expanding 
the Supreme Court’s 1985 opinion in Aspen Skiing Co v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp90 (which 
she stresses was described by the Supreme Court in Trinko
91
 as “at or near the outer boundary” 
of U.S. antitrust law), turning contractual obligations into antitrust claims, and for departing from 
current federal agency practice, by imposing remedies requiring Qualcomm to negotiate or 
renegotiate contracts with customers and competitors worldwide. She has thus urged the Ninth 
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Circuit (on appeal), and if necessary the Supreme Court, to assess the wisdom of these sweeping 
changes and to stay the ruling.
92
 
 It seems likely therefore that, at the same time as bringing cases seeking to develop 
procedural, evidential and substantive antitrust standards under the existing regime, additional 
antidotes to the stringencies of existing jurisprudence will be required, including: more 
extensive, and expansive, use of Section 5 FTC Act to plug the gaps created by the narrowing of 
the scope of Section 2 Sherman Act; and/or the adoption of legislation that directs courts to apply 
a wider goals framework.  
B. Infirmities of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act  
One possible solution to rigidities that have developed in Sherman Act jurisprudence is for the 
FTC to rely more heavily on the prosecution, through its own administrative process, of cases 
based on Section 5 of the FTC Act and its prohibition of “unfair methods of competition.”93 This 
section allows the FTC
94
 to tackle, not only anticompetitive practices prohibited by the other 
antitrust statutes, but also conduct constituting incipient violations of those statutes or behaviour 
that exceeds their reach. The latter is possible where the conduct does not infringe the letter of 
the antitrust laws but contradicts their basic spirit or public policy.
95
  
 There is no doubt therefore that Section 5 was designed as an expansion joint in the U.S. 
antitrust system. It seems unlikely to us, nonetheless, that a majority of the FTC’s current 
members will be minded to use it in this way. Further, even if they were to be, the reality is that 
such an application may encounter difficulties. Since its creation in 1914, the FTC has never 
prevailed before the Supreme Court in any case challenging dominant firm misconduct, whether 
premised on Section 2 of the Sherman Act or purely on Section 5 of the FTC Act.
96
 The last FTC 
success in federal court in a case predicated solely on Section 5 occurred in the late 1960s.
97
  
 The FTC’s record of limited success with Section 5 has not been for want of trying.  In the 
1970s, the FTC undertook an ambitious program to make the enforcement of claims predicated 
on the distinctive reach of Section 5 a foundation to develop “competition policy in its broadest 
sense.”98 The agency’s Section 5 agenda yielded some successes,99 but also a large number of 
litigation failures involving cases to address subtle forms of coordination in oligopolies, to 
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impose new obligations on dominant firms, and to dissolve shared monopolies.
100
 The agency’s 
program elicited powerful legislative backlash from a Congress that once supported the FTC’s 




C. Designing Effective Remedies  
Important issues arising for the new enforcement strategy proposed will be what remedies should 
be sought; how can an order, or decree, be fashioned to ensure that the violation is terminated, 
that competition on the market is restored, the opportunity for competition is re-established, and 




 The Sherman Act treats infringements of its key commands as crimes attracting severe 
sanctions, including fines (corporate and individual) and imprisonment. Although since 1980 the 
DOJ has used criminal prosecutions only to challenge hard core horizontal cartels,
103
 some 
antitrust reform proponents have are calling for the introduction of fines to sanction illegal 
monopolization, and some commentators have proposed that the DOJ reconsider its policy of not 
seeking criminal penalties beyond the Section 1 conspiracy context.
104
  For the time being, 
however, it would appear that existing civil sanctions will remain the tool of choice for DOJ in 
dealing with antitrust infringements and will be the only set of remedies available to the FTC, 
which has no mandate to bring criminal cases.  
 The civil remedial options, which can broadly be grouped into three categories, for the 
federal agencies are nonetheless powerful in principle. The first and, perhaps, most common 
form of remedy consists of controls on conduct. Conduct-related relief ordinarily takes the form 
of cease and desist orders that forbid certain behaviour or, in smaller number of cases, compel 
firms to engage in affirmative acts, such as providing a competitor access to an asset needed to 
compete.  
 The second major form of remedy is structural relief in the form of divestitures or the 
compulsory licensing of intellectual property that enables a firm to enter a previously 
monopolized market.  The boundary between purely conduct-based and structural remedies is 
not always clear.  A compulsory licensing decree has strong structural features (it directly 
facilitates new entry) and conduct elements (it may require the owner of the patent to provide the 
licensee know-how and updates of the patented technology).  
 The third remedy consists of civil monetary relief in the form of disgorgement of ill-gotten 
gains or the restitution of monopoly overcharges to victims.  A number of Supreme Court 
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decisions in monopolization cases in the late 1940s and early 1950s appeared to hold that these 
forms of recovery are encompassed in the mandate of courts to order equitable remedies to cure 
antitrust violations. The federal agencies have not used this power expansively, though it would 
appear to be available to recoup overcharges in Section 2 or other cases.
105
   
 The cures envisaged by many of the advocates of change call for the bold application of the 
full portfolio of civil remedies, including unwinding past mergers, divestment of assets, 
restructuring concentrated markets, limiting or reversing vertical integration or through the 
imposition of licensing obligations. Such advocates thus wish the DOJ and FTC to use the 
antitrust laws as an effective and simple mechanism for deconcentrating both monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets, rapidly introducing new competition into a market; and reversing what 




 Structural remedies in particular have always been a real and important part of the antitrust 
remedial arsenal,
107
 not only in merger cases where a violation of the antitrust rules may consist 
of an unlawful acquisition of shares or stock,
108
 but also in Sherman Act cases.
109
 In the 1960s 
the FTC also sought, using its powers under Section 5 FTC Act to deconcentrate the petrol and 
breakfast cereal markets
110
 and in 1969 the Neal Report,
111
 commissioned by President Lyndon 
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Johnson, proposed the adoption of laws which would allow oligopolistic industries to be 
deconcentrated and the condemnation of mergers on markets that were already concentrated.
112
 
 Modern antitrust has, however, had less appetite for the use of antitrust to break up 
companies. Although the District Court in United States v Microsoft Corp
113
 ordered, at the 
request of the DOJ, that Microsoft be broken into two parts, the Court of Appeals, despite 
affirming the violation of section 2, reversed and remanded the finding that Microsoft should be 
split into two. Setting out a high bar for structural relief, the Court stressed that the lower court 
had not (1) held a remedies-specific hearing;
114




 A number of factors seem responsible for the trend away from structural remedies. First, the 
change in antitrust thinking that has evolved since the early 70s, from a belief that antitrust 
intervention and structural remedies can improve performance
116
 to the current more laissez-faire 
one.
117
 Second, concerns about the effectiveness of previous attempts to deconcentrate 
industries
118
 especially given the length of time that antitrust proceedings take.
119
 Third, the 
difficulty involved in constructing and overseeing a structural remedy effectively. Although in 
cases involving a merger or acquisition it may be relatively easy to structure such a remedy 
through disentangling assets that were once owned separately,
120
 outside of this situation, the 
question of how and what to divest might be much more speculative, seem much more risky and 
may in fact be complex and difficult to administer (involving significant restructuring, separation 
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of physical facilities and allocation of staff from integrated teams).
121
 These types of concern 
make it a challenge to persuade a court that a structural remedy is warranted and will be 
successful in achieving its objective.
122
 
 In the discussion above, we have been addressing the types of remedies that are imposed at 
the conclusion of a lawsuit. A problem in highly dynamic markets, however, is that the lag 
between the initiation of a case and a final order on relief may be so great that market 
circumstances have changed dramatically and the victim of allegedly improper exclusion may 
have left the market or otherwise lost its opportunity to expand and contest the position of the 
incumbent dominant firm. In this context, the antitrust cure arrives far too late to protect 
competition. The relatively slow pace of antitrust investigations and litigation (with appeals that 
follow an initial decision) has led some observers to doubt the efficacy of antitrust cases as 
effective policy making tools in dynamic commercial sectors. 
 There are at least five possible responses to concerns about the speed of antitrust litigation, 
particularly matters involving dominant firms.  First, agencies could experiment with ways to 
accelerate investigations, and courts could adopt innovative techniques to shorten the length of 
trials.  In the United States, we perceive that greater integration of effort among the public 
agencies would permit the more rapid completion of investigations (e.g., by pooling knowledge 
and focusing more resources on the collection and evaluation of evidence).  Courts could use 
methods tested with success in the DOJ prosecution of Microsoft in the late 1990s to truncate the 
presentation of evidence.  These types of measures have some promise to bring matters to a close 
more quickly. 
 Second, the initiation of a lawsuit could be recognised as being, in some important ways, its 
own remedy; the prosecution of a case by itself causes the firm to change its behavior in ways 
that gives rivals more breathing room to grow.  Moreover, the visible presence of the 
enforcement authority, manifest by its investigations and lawsuits, causes other firms to 
reconsider tactics that arguably violate the law.  Seen in this light, the entry of a final order that 
specifies remedies may not be necessary in all instances to have the desired chastening effect. 
 A third response is to experiment more broadly with interim relief that seeks to suspend 
certain types of exclusionary conduct pending the completion of the full trial.
123
  Effective 
interim measures would require the enforcement agency to develop a base of knowledge about 
the sector that enables it to accurately identify the practices to be enjoined on an interim basis 
and to give judges a confident basis for intervening in this manner.  
 A fourth approach would be that the remedies achieved in protracted antitrust litigation may 
not be so imperfect or untimely as they might appear to be.  There have been a number of 
instances in which the remedy achieved in a monopolization case was rebuked as desperately 
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insufficient when ordered but turned out to have positive competitive consequences.
124
  This is a 
humbling and difficult aspect of policy making.  It may not be easy for an agency to persuade its 
political overseers – or other external audiences – that the chief benefits of its intervention will 
emerge in, say, two or three decades.  Yet the positive results may take a long time to become 
apparent.  
 A fifth technique would be to rely more heavily on ex ante regulation in the form of trade 
regulation rules that forbid certain practices.  A competition authority – most likely the FTC – 
would use its rulemaking powers to proscribe specific types of conduct (e.g., self-preferencing 
by dominant information services platforms). 
 In this Article, we do not purport to solve the problems of remedial design set out above.  
There is, however, a fairly clear conclusion about how enforcement agencies should go about 
thinking of remedies.  As we note below, there is considerable room for public agencies to 
design remedies more effectively by systematically examining past experience and collaborating 
with external researchers to identify superior techniques. In this regard, the FTC’s collection of 
policy tools would appear to make it the ideal focal point for the development of more effective 
approaches to remedial design.       
D. Political Backlash 
As we have already indicated, the government’s prosecution of high stakes antitrust cases often 
inspires defendants to lobby elected officials to rein in the enforcement agency.  Targets of cases 
that seek to impose powerful remedies have several possible paths to encourage politicians to 
blunt enforcement measures.  One path is to seek intervention from the President.  The Assistant 
Attorney General of the Antitrust Division serves at the will of the President, making DOJ policy 
dependent on the President’s continuing support.  The White House ordinarily does not guide the 
Antitrust Division’s selection of cases, but there have been instances in which the President 
pressured the Division to alter course on behalf of a defendant, and did so successfully.
125
  
 The second path is to lobby the Congress.  The FTC is called an “independent” regulatory 
agency, but Congress interprets independence in an idiosyncratic way.
126
  Legislators believes 
independence means insulation from the executive branch, not from the legislature.  The FTC is 
dependent on a good relationship with Congress, which controls its budget and can react with 
hostility, and forcefully, when it disapproves of FTC litigation – particularly where it adversely 
affects the interests of members’ constituents. Controversial and contested cases may 
consequently be derailed or muted if political support for them wanes and politicians become 
more sympathetic to commercial interests. The FTC’s sometimes tempestuous relationship with 
Congress demonstrates that political coalitions favoring bold enforcement can be volatile, 
unpredictable, and evanescent.
127
  If the FTC does not manage its relationship with Congress 
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carefully, its litigation opponents may mobilize legislative intervention that cause ambitious 
enforcement measures to founder. 
 Imagine, for a moment, that the DOJ and the FTC launch monopolization cases against each 
of the GAFA giants.  Among other grounds, these cases might be premised on the theory that the 
firms used mergers to accumulate and protect positions of dominance.  The GAFA firms have 
received unfavorable scrutiny from legislators from both political parties over the past few years, 
but the current wave of political opprobrium is unlikely to discourage the firms from bringing 
their formidable lobbying resources to bear upon the Congress.  It would be hazardous for the 
enforcement agencies to assume that a sustained, well-financed lobbying campaign will be 
ineffective.  At a minimum, the agencies would need to consider how many battles they can fight 
at one time, and how to foster a countervailing coalition of business interests to oppose the 
defendants.    
E. Opposition to Legislative Reform  
Although statutory reform might at first sight appear to be a direct, effective solution to some of 
the impediments (such as entrenched judicial resistance to intervention), there are good reasons 
to expect that powerful business interests will also stoutly oppose any proposals for legislation to 
expand the reach of the antitrust laws, or to create a new digital regulator.
128
 One can envisage 
the formidable financial and political resources of the affected firms will amass to stymie far-
reaching legislative reforms. Legislative steps that threaten the structure, operations, and 
profitability of the Tech Giants and other leading firms are fraught with political risk. These risks 
are surmountable, but only by means of a clever strategy that anticipates and blunts political 
pressure. One element of such a strategy is to mobilize countervailing support from consumer 
and business interests to sustain an enabling political environment to enact ambitious new laws. 
 Even if successful, “[l]egislative relief from existing jurisprudential structures might take 
years to accomplish”;129 acts taken under new legislation – even with the establishment of 
presumptions that improve the litigation position of government plaintiffs – may still be 
relatively complex and difficult to prosecute. Rulemaking is an alternative to litigation, but it is 
no easy way out of the problem.  On the contrary, promulgation and defense, in litigation, of a 
major trade regulation rule is liable to take as long as the prosecution of a Section 2 case.  It can 
also be anticipated that a judiciary populated with many regulation skeptics will subject new 
rules or related measures to demanding scrutiny.   
IV. OPTIMAL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES 
A. Finding a Path 
In Section III above, we described the obstacles that are likely to stand in the way of 
accomplishing a significant reconstruction of U.S. antitrust doctrine and enforcement policy. To 
some degree, the severity of the obstacles depends on how ambitious the chosen reform program 
turns out to be. The aims and means of the “do more with what you have” group are challenging 
enough, but they pale in comparison to the difficulties presented by the proposals of the root-
and-branch transformation advocates. The latter group would place greater demands on the 
implementing institutions through, e.g., initiating a larger number of major cases and seeking 
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more powerful structural remedies, and by insisting that the entire program be undertaken 
quickly and decisively rather than at a more moderate tempo.  
 Although successful accomplishment and delivery of reforms, more moderate and more 
ambitious, alike, will require awareness and a realistic assessment of likely implementation 
obstacles and a conscious effort to develop a strategy to surmount them (it has been seen that 
history provides sobering examples of failures where similar, significant implementation barriers 
have not been considered or have been discounted
130
), such barriers are not a formula for timidity 
or a reason not to undertake change. Rather, understanding them helps guide the design of a 
successful program. To return to our U.S. space program analogy,
131
 an indispensable foundation 
for the ultimate success of the Apollo program was the commitment of NASA and its contractors 
to understand the full magnitude of the task before them and to anticipate all hazards that would 
confront human spaceflight to and from the Moon’s surface.132 The probing analysis of risks 
inspired successful efforts to find solutions. Operating in an unforgiving environment where 
even small errors could be catastrophic, humans landed on the Moon and returned safely to 
Earth.  
 This section consequently discusses approaches for navigating the reform implementation 
challenges. Our most important caution is that the reforms – more dramatic and less sweeping – 
will require substantial upgrades in the capabilities and performance of the institutions 
responsible for implementation.  The more ambitious the reform, the more urgent is the need to 
enhance capabilities. Further, the prospects of success for the public agencies (federal and state) 
are likely to improve if they can formulate a common strategy to overcome identified obstacles. 
Doing so will demand planned, joined-up, and consensual enforcement by the public 
enforcement agencies and a forthright self-assessment of existing operations and capabilities – to 
repair institutional flaws, to temper interagency disagreements, and to acquire the human capital 
needed to run a new, large collection of difficult antitrust suits. 
B. Augmenting the Human Capital of the Enforcement Agencies 
Measures to expand federal antitrust intervention dramatically – through the prosecution of 
lawsuits or the promulgation of trade regulation rules – will face arduous opposition from the 
affected businesses. Assuming that litigation will provide the main method in the coming few 
years to attack positions of single-firm or collective dominance, the targets of big antitrust cases 
will marshal the best talent that private law firms, economic consultancies, and academic bodies 
can offer to oppose the government in court. The defense will benefit from doctrinal principles 
that generally are sympathetic to dominant firms (again, we assume that legislation to change the 
doctrinal status quo will not be immediately forthcoming). Beyond a certain point, the addition 
of new, high stakes cases to the litigation portfolio of public antitrust agencies will create a 
serious gap between the teams assembled for the prosecution and defense, respectively. Although 
therefore the public agencies can match the private sector punch for punch when prosecuting 
several major de-monopolization cases, when the volume of such cases rises from several to 
many, the government agencies may have to rely on personnel with considerably less experience 
to develop and prosecute difficult antitrust cases, seeking powerful remedies upon global giants. 
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 An enhanced litigation program will therefore go only as far as the talent of the agencies will 
carry it.  We propose three steps to build and retain the human capital – attorneys, economists, 
technologists, and administrative managers
133
 – to undertake a more ambitious litigation 
program. The first is to use antitrust as a prototype for a program to raise civil service salaries.  
The second two steps consist of cautions about the dangers of (a) denigrating the skills and 
accomplishments of existing agency personnel, and (b) attempting to shut the revolving door 
through which professionals move between the public and private sectors. We discuss all three of 
these steps below. 
 (i) Resources and Compensation. To accomplish the desired expansion of enforcement, we 
see a need for more resources.
134
 Nonetheless, budget increases that simply allow the 
enforcement agencies to hire additional staff, while useful, are not enough. We would use more 
resources to boost compensation for agency employees.  This means taking the antitrust agencies 
out of the existing civil service pay scale. The need is not simply to hire more people. It is to 
attract a larger number of elite personnel who are equal to the tasks that the ambitious reform 
agenda will impose. We do not see how the public agencies can recruit and retain necessary 
personnel without a significant increase in the salaries paid to case handlers and to senior 
managers. It surprises us that none of the proposals for bold reform mention compensation for 
civil servants. 
 Consider two possibilities for compensation reform. The first is to align antitrust salaries to 
the highest scale paid to the financial service regulators. Here the model would be the scale of 
salaries paid to employees of the U.S. banking regulatory agencies; the salary scale for these 
regulatory bodies exceeds the General Schedule federal civil service wage scale by roughly 
twenty percent.
135
 A second alternative involves a more dramatic change, perhaps more easily 
accomplished at the FTC, which is a self-contained agency, than at the DOJ Antitrust Division, 
which is a relatively small part of a much larger bureaucracy. One might take the FTC’s existing 
budget of about $330 million per year and triple it, setting the amount at $1 billion per year and 
use the increase to raise salaries. We would conduct this experiment for a decade to test whether 
a major hike in pay would increase the agency’s ability to recruit the best talent and keep the 
talent at home for a significant period of time. 
 We see this as a crucial test of the commitment and sincerity of the political leadership that 
seeks basic change. If fundamental competition policy reforms mean so much to the nation’s 
well-being, then the country will need to pay to achieve it. Such steps will become even more 
important if new political leadership seeks to close the revolving door, which has operated as a 
mechanism to encourage attorneys and economists to accept lower salaries in federal service in 
the expectation of receiving much higher compensation in the private sector at a later time. 
 (ii) Respecting Past Achievements. In the U.S., there is an unfortunate habit of making the 
case for major reforms by depicting the existing policy making institutions as utterly 
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incompetent, slothful, or corrupt.
136
 Reform advocates sometimes appear to believe that any 
recognition that existing institutions sometimes have done good work undermines the case for 
fundamental reform. There is a perceived imperative to portray the responsible bodies and their 
leaders as hopelessly inadequate. Electoral campaigns can sharpen this tendency by leading the 
opposition party to claim that the incumbent administration’s program was an unrelieved failure.   
 In a striking number of instances, this pattern has emerged in discussions of antitrust 
policy.
137
 In current discussions about the future of the U.S. antitrust regime, advocates of 
fundamental reform sometimes portray the federal antitrust enforcement agencies as decrepit  -- 
perhaps to underscore the need for basic change.
138
 The proponents of root-and-branch 
transformation often suggest that only a complete makeover of the antitrust system will enable 
antitrust law to fulfill its intended role. The implication is that, because the antitrust system has 
failed so miserably, there are few, if any, positive lessons to be derived from experience since the 
retrenchment of U.S. policy began in the late 1970s, and certainly none since 2000. 
This style of argument has several potential costs. One danger is that it overlooks genuine 
accomplishments and, in doing so, ignores experience that suggests how to build successful 
programs in the future. Consider three examples that deserve close study in building future cases 
that seek to expand the reach of the antitrust system.  The first is the development of the FTC’s 
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical health care program from the mid-1970s forward; this 
initiative used the full range of the agency’s policy tools – cases, rules, reports, and advocacy – 
to change doctrine and alter business behavior.
139
 A second example is the FTC’s effort over the 
past two decades to restore the effectiveness of the quick look as an analytical tool in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. California Dental Association.140 




 The programs that accounted for these results were not accidental. Each program began with 
a careful examination of the existing framework of doctrine and policy to identify desired areas 
of extension.  This stock-taking guided the identification of potential candidates for cases and the 
application of other policy making tools.
142
 Each program built incrementally upon the bipartisan 
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contributions of agency leadership and the sustained commitment of staff across several 
presidential administrations headed by Democrats and Republicans. If one assumes (as a number 
of reform proponents assert) that the FTC was a useless body in the modern era, there would be 
little purpose in studying these examples, or anything else it did, as there would be nothing 
useful to learn. The paint-it-black interpretation of modern antitrust history makes the costly 
error of tossing aside experience that might inform the successful implementation of new 
reforms.  
 A second notable cost of the catastrophe narrative, most relevant to the discussion of human 
capital, is its demoralizing effect on the agency’s existing managers and staff. To see one’s 
previous work portrayed as substandard, or worse, tends not to inspire superior effort. It breeds 
cynicism and distrust where managers and staff understand that the critique badly distorts what 
they have done. Proponents of basic change must realize that the success of their program to 
expand antitrust intervention will require major contributions from existing staff and managers.  
 (iii) Capture and the Revolving Door. The modern critique of the U.S. system often 
describes the federal agencies as captured by the business community or beholden to ideas that 
disfavor robust intervention.
143
 Advocates of change suggest that the execution of their reform 
program at the federal antitrust agencies will require the appointment of senior managers and 
new staff who repudiate the consumer welfare standard, or at least embrace vision for expanded 
enforcement under the consumer welfare, and embrace the multidimensional conception of the 
proper goals of competition law. Those already employed by the enforcement agencies as 
managers and staff will be expected to accept the expanded (goals) framework or they will find 
their duties reduced and their roles marginalized. New appointees to top leadership positions will 
not be tainted by substantial previous experience in the private sector, nor will they have spent 
too much time as civil servants in a government enforcement culture that assumed the primacy of 
consumer welfare as the aim of antitrust law and accepted norms that tilted toward 
underenforcement. The concern about compromised motives is also likely to disqualify many 
academics who, though sympathetic to some expansion of antitrust enforcement, remain 
excessively beholden to some notion of a consumer (rather than citizen) welfare standard, or 
have engaged in consulting on behalf of large corporate interests. 
 One consequence of the acute anxiety about capture is to slam the revolving door shut, or at 
least to slow the rate at which it spins. We offer two cautions about this approach. First, the 
modern experience of the FTC raises reasons to question the strength of the theory. For example, 
if business perspectives dominate the FTC, why did the agency persist in its efforts to challenge 
reverse payment agreements involving leading pharmaceutical producers?
 144
 Was it because the 
pharmaceutical firms weren’t as good at lobbying as, say, the information services giants?  And 
what explains the FTC’s decision to sue Qualcomm for monopolization early in 2017?145  Is this 
simply attributable to the inadequacy of Qualcomm’s Washington, D.C. lobbyists, or is the 
capture explanation for the behavior of the federal antitrust agencies not entirely airtight? 
 Our second caution is that severe restrictions on the revolving door could deny the federal 
agencies access to skills they will need to carry out a major expansion of antitrust enforcement.  
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Recruiting attorneys, economists, and other specialists from the private sector can give the 
agencies a vital infusion of talent which, when combined with agency careerists, permit the 
creation of project teams that can equal the capability of the best teams that the defense can 
mount in major litigation matters. We also are wary of the idea that an attorney or economist 
coming from the private sector will discourage effective intervention during the period of public 
service as a way to pave the road to a better private sector position upon leaving the agency.  
Rather, there is evidence to suggest that creating a reputation for aggressiveness and toughness 
as an enforcer increases one’s post-agency employment options. More than a few individuals 
have development prosperous careers based upon piloting businesses through navigational 
hazards that they helped create while they were senior officials in public agencies. 
C. Common Public Enforcement Strategy  
The U.S. antitrust system is famous for its decentralization of the power to prosecute, giving 
many entities – public agencies (at both the federal and state levels), consumers, and businesses 
– competence to enforce the federal antitrust laws. The federal enforcement regime also coexists 
with state antitrust laws and with sectoral regulation, at the national and state levels, that includes 
a competition policy mandate. 
 The extraordinary decentralization and multiplicity of enforcement mechanisms supply 
valuable possibilities for experimentation and provide safeguards in case any single enforcement 
agent is disabled (e.g., due to capture, resource austerity, or corruption).
146
 Among public 
agencies, there is also the possibility that federal and state government institutions, while 
preserving the benefits of experimentation and redundancy, could improve performance through 
cooperation that allows them to perform tasks collectively that each could accomplish with great 
difficulty, or not at all, if they act in isolation.  For models of successful interagency cooperation, 
one might study the successful policy integration that has taken place through the work of the 
United Kingdom Competition Network and the European Competition Network.  In both 
examples one can see the mix of organizational structures and personal leadership that enabled 
agencies collectively to accomplish policy results that would have been unattainable through the 
work of single agencies operating in isolation.    
 We doubt the ambitious litigation agenda demanded in the modern reform proposals is 
attainable if the public agencies adhere to traditional practices that overlook the expansion of 
outcome and increase in quality that superior interagency cooperation could generate. A 
suggested program of fuller integration would have the following elements. 
 (i) Development of a Common Strategy. The path toward a major expansion of the existing 
litigation program will require careful planning that begins with the formulation of a joined-up 
strategy implemented harmoniously by the DOJ and FTC. The starting point for the common 
strategy is to map out the existing contours of doctrine, identify the high ground for intervention 
that modern jurisprudence has established, select projects to reshape doctrine and other elements 
of antitrust policy, allocate them to the best-placed agency to act and avoid duplication of 
resources on identical or overlapping investigations.  
 A second focal point in the analysis of the doctrinal status quo would be to consider how 
existing precedents can be employed to build successful cases and how doctrinal frontiers can be 
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 An important element of this mapping exercise is to understand why the courts have 
embraced more permissive standards over the past four decades. This assessment would facilitate 
the preparation of effective arguments to persuade judges to rethink it. Among other effects, we 
anticipate that this inquiry will reveal how perspectives beyond the modern Chicago School have 
influenced judicial thinking. In particular, it will demonstrate how a number of jurists have 
abandoned a multi-dimensional goals framework in favor of an efficiency orientation out of 
concern for “administrability” considerations posed by the modern Harvard School of Phillip 
Areeda and Donald Turner. To gain the support of jurists such as Stephen Breyer (whose 
antitrust views bear the mark of Areeda’s influence), it will be necessary to show that the 
restoration of a new antitrust framework, or an egalitarian goals framework, would not lead to 
unpredictable and inconsistent litigation outcomes as each judge sought to weigh efficiency 
concerns or efficiency concerns alongside other values, such as preserving opportunities for 
small enterprises to compete.
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 A third element of common strategy would be lessons derived from the examination of the 
agencies’ base of experience to determine what combination of policy tools – cases, studies, 
rules, advocacy – offer the best means to effectuate change in the market, and to use this 
experience base to design specific remedies.  Since its creation in 1890, the U.S. competition law 
system has generated a mass of information about the techniques for government intervention. 
As explained further below, the government’s “big antitrust data” can be mined to shed light on 
what is likely to work.  For example, experience in implementing major structural remedies 
pursuant to decrees in Section 2 monopolization cases and by legislation such as the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 offer important lessons about how to design and carry out 
the restructuring of major business enterprises.
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 The study of past experience also reveals that it is a mistake, as part of a reform program, to 
focus all of an agency’s resources on the prosecution of big cases against big companies to the 
exclusion of smaller matters.  The history of U.S. Section 2 enforcement shows that small cases 
can make big law by establishing doctrinal principles that support subsequent successful 
prosecutions of large enterprises,
150
 
 (ii) Project Selection Methodology. Project selection is the process by which an antitrust 
agency chooses the tools it will use to accomplish its policy aims. There is growing recognition 
among antitrust authorities that improvements in the methodology of project selection can 
strengthen the prospects of success for any single initiative. Adapted for the purpose of executing 
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a major reform program, a good project selection methodology would pose a series of questions 
about every proposed initiative.
151
 
 First, what does the agency expect to achieve if the project succeeds? Will it improve 
economic conditions, realign doctrine, or both? By defining anticipated gains, the agency can 
better understand how many resources to commit to a specific measure and make a better-
informed decision about how much risk to accept. This inquiry also helps focus the agency’s 
attention, from the earliest days of the project’s preparation, on the design of remedies to cure 
apparent problems. The consideration of benefits to be attained and the means for realizing them 
can lead an agency to reflect carefully about whether the proposed project is the best way to 
solve the problem at hand. In some instances, a different sequence of initiatives may provide the 
best path to a solution – for example, to begin with a market study, and then bring cases based on 
the learning from the study. 
 Second, what risks does the project pose? How will a project failure – such as a litigation 
defeat – affect the market and the agency? Will the agency be able to sustain political support for 
its projects, or will the targets of intervention mobilize a political coalition to constrain the 
agency by, for example, curbing its authority or budget? To succeed, agencies must be mindful 
of the shifting sands in politics and be prepared with countermeasures to deal with situations 
where relevant politicians’ interests change and become more sympathetic to commercial 
interests. Important issues therefore will be whether current political supporters of reform have 
the staying power to back agencies for the five to ten years it might take to carry out cases 
successfully, what steps agencies can take to ensure sustained political support and to deal with 
swings in the political environment and whether financial support from the affected firms may be 
used to sway, or can be prevented from swaying, the political process and buckle political 
resolve. 
 Third, who will carry out the project? Which agency and does that agency have talent 
available, or can it acquire needed talent in a timely manner, to perform the project successfully 
and overcome the opposition it will face where the agency seeks strong remedies for individual 
firms or entire sectors of the economy? A clear-headed answer to these questions helps avoid the 
creation of large gaps between the agency’s commitments and its ability to fulfill them in 
practice. Because it may be better attuned to the agency’s capabilities, a more gradual approach 
to rolling out a reform program may have better prospects for success than the launch of a 
number of large, complex cases all at the same time. One of the biggest hazards we see 
especially in the root-and-branch reform agenda, is that it entails the rapid commencement of 
many ambitious projects that will place impossible demands on the capabilities of the antitrust 
agencies. 
 Fourth, what will the project cost be in terms of personnel and out-of-pocket expenditures 
for items such as expert witnesses to support cases? This inquiry helps the agency make a 
realistic prediction of the resources needed to carry out individual projects, and prepare 
disciplined estimates for future budget requests. 
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 How long will it take the agency to complete the project? This inquiry helps the agency 
determine whether its anticipated intervention and remedy will occur fast enough to solve an 
observed problem. If years may pass before the agency obtains a desired remedy at the 
conclusion of a lawsuit, it may be necessary to consider interim measures to correct behavior that 
poses immediate competitive dangers if allowed to continue. By establishing an expected 
timetable at the outset, the agency equips its leadership with a valuable management tool to track 
a project’s progress. 
 How does the proposed project fit into the portfolio of the agency’s existing projects? If the 
agency examines each project in isolation, it can lose sight of the overall condition of its program 
portfolio. A portfolio-wide perspective enables the agency to assess the full range of risks it has 
assumed and, again, to see that it is achieving a good fit between its commitments and its 
capabilities.   
 How will the agency know that the project, if undertaken, is having its desired effects? It is a 
helpful exercise to identify how an agency’s intervention will bring about change in the market. 
What are the anticipated effects on prices, product quality, new business entry, or other 
economic conditions? When are these effects likely to become apparent? This exercise helps the 
agency develop realistic expectations about the magnitude and timing of anticipated benefits.  
From its past experience, the agency may be aware that some benefits may take years – perhaps 
decades – to become apparent.   
 The specification of performance benchmarks also plays a crucial role of facilitating the ex 
post evaluation of outcomes. A very basic form of assessment is to compare the agency’s 
assumptions about a project when it begins with the knowledge it gains in the course of 
implementation. If anticipated performance falls below expectations (perhaps because a 
significant factor was overlooked), how can the project selection process be improved to account 
for the factor in the future? Taking careful stock of past measures that worked – and learning 
lessons from the failures – is a vital way to design new initiatives more effectively. 
D. Enabling the FTC to Perform Its Intended Function 
 A number of the proposals for expansive reform would give the FTC a broader and fuller 
role in formulating competition policy. Several features of its original design make the 
Commission an attractive vehicle for carrying out a program of basic reforms. It has been seen 
that the FTC Act gives the Commission a broad, scalable mandate (Section 5’s prohibition on 
“unfair methods of competition”) to prohibit behavior not reached by existing interpretations of 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The agency also has expansive authority to collect information 
from firms through compulsory processes and to publish reports.
152
 The statute also intended that 




 Under the program of greater interagency cooperation we have proposed above, the FTC 
would use Section 5 of the FTC to seek to extend the boundaries of existing doctrine and to use 
its information gathering and reporting powers to set the empirical basis for proposed extensions. 
The starting point for this effort would be to examine the agency’s past (and rare) Section 5 
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litigation successes for lessons about how to gain judicial acceptance for an extension of antitrust 
doctrine.
154
  The Commission also would serve, in effect, as the main public agency resource on 
remedies. The agency would use its analytical resources and experience in evaluating the 
effectiveness of antitrust remedies to guide the formulation of remedies in Sherman Act and 
Clayton Act cases, in addition to Section 5 cases. The agency would employ the large body of 
experience that that the U.S. system and other systems have collected in the use of structural and 
behavioral remedies to suggest solutions in specific cases. 
 We suggest three legislative changes to enable the Commission to fulfill the role we have 
described above. The first is to relax restrictions that the Government in the Sunshine Act
155
 
imposes on the ability of commissioners to deliberate together privately to discuss matters of 
strategy and tactics. Among other consequences, the Sunshine Act severely limits the ability of a 
quorum of commissioners to deliberate over matters of agency policy except in meetings open to 
the public.
156
 The policy planning functions that we see as essential to an expanded role cannot 
be performed at a high level without this reform.
157
  
 A second essential step is to eliminate statutory exemptions that deny the FTC jurisdiction 
over common carriers, not for profit institutions, and banks. A third reform would confer powers 
on the FTC to conduct market studies, and obtain information necessary to allow it to carry out 
its functions, and market investigations in the same way as the UK’s Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA).
158
 For example, Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002
159
 enables the CMA to 
investigate markets where it appears that the structure of the market or the conduct of suppliers 
or customers in the market is harming competition and, where problems are identified, to 
propose steps to mitigate, remedy, prevent or overcome them. This would enable to FTC to study 
sectoral or economy-wide phenomena and to impose remedies regardless of whether the 
conditions or practices in question violate the antitrust laws. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In the U.S., as in many other parts of the world, pressure is on the competition agencies to make 
2020, and the new decade, a period of sustained and effective antitrust action, targeting 
especially the business models of digital platforms. Pending any longer-term more fundamental 
reforms, many commentators are calling for immediate, rapid and heightened competition 
scrutiny of a wide range of practices (including mergers (future and past), business practices of 
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digital firms, restricted distribution and price setting practices) and the use of intrusive remedies 
to fix antitrust problems going forward.  
 These demands are imposing formidable expectations on the shoulders of competition 
agencies. Meeting them will not happen by chance or through a reactive and ad hoc approach. 
Indeed, without careful planning an ambitious enforcement program involving a large number of 
complex litigations being pursued concurrently, would risk agency managers and case handlers 
becoming overrun, and the failure of the program. This paper consequently proposes a more 
tempered, gradual and joined-up approach to reform, involving carefully constructed and 
coordinated strategies to overcome anticipated obstacles, painstaking planning and case 
allocation, and the selection of some initial complementary (but not overlapping) high profile 
case prototypes for each agency to pursue before the program is expanded in steps. 
 Both federal agencies have investigative powers but we propose that the FTC should make 
full use of its fact-finding powers to collect information on industries or sectors selected for 
investigation. Further, that before prosecutions are launched a methodology is followed for 
selecting appropriate cases for prosecution, taking account of past achievements and failures, the 
goal(s) to be achieved in bringing the case, the chance of success (especially given current 
doctrinal limitations) and opportunities for reshaping law and policy, the prospect for achieving 
those goals through antitrust action and remedies (rather than, for example, advocacy or other 
mechanisms), which agency is best placed to act, and whether that agency has the tools and staff 
available to take on the case now (taking account of other agency commitments). Essential to all 
of the proposals is a need for the agencies to anticipate and account for political backlash, and for 
human capital in the agencies to be augmented. It is only through recognizing the skills of 
existing staff and through finding realistic and achievable mechanisms to retain and recruit 
talented staff that the agencies will achieve the skill set diversity required to take on 
sophisticated and powerful firms, backed by formidable teams of lawyers and experts.  
 
